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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
David Christensen is a

man with no prior criminal history who

was convicted of five counts of lewd conduct with a minor. PSI.

The Court should vacate

the convictions because the trial court abused its discretion when admitting the CARES
hearsay statements of developmentally delayed children under I.R.E. 803(4), in part
because there was insufficient evidence that the children knew the statements were for the
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.

The court also abused its discretion when it

admitted the entire CARES videos without consideration of which particular statements fell
within the hearsay exception.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts
1.

Pretrial proceedings

Mr. Christensen was charged by indictment with five counts of Lewd Conduct with a
Minor Under Sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508.

Counts 1-3 alleged the manual-genital touching of

A.M.O. on or between May 27 – 28 of 2017.1 Count 4-5 alleged that A.G.O. was similarly
touched, once on May 27-28, and once on March 18, 2017. R 13-14.

Mr. Christensen

pleaded not guilty to all counts. R 31.
2.

CARES interview videos

The state filed a Notice of Intent to Introduce St. Luke’s CARES Medical Records
under both the statement for purposes of medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule
(I.R.E. 803(4)) and the so-called “catch-all” hearsay exception (I.R.E. 803(24)). R 43.

While the Indictment uses and this brief will use initials, the girls’ names were used
throughout the court proceedings. T pg. 89, ln. 12-13.
1
1

Mr.

Christensen objected to the admission of the evidence.

R 57.

At the hearing on the motion in limine, the St. Luke’s “forensic interviewer,” Lara
Foster, explained that a “forensic interview is a structured conversation utilized to gain
information or detail regarding something that the child has experienced or possibly
witnessed.”

T pg. 13, ln. 1-4.

medical providers.

The CARES program employs six social workers and eight

T pg. 22, ln. 5-16.

Social workers conduct the forensic interviews.

Any medical examinations or treatment are done by the medical providers.

Id.

She interviewed A.M.O. and A.G.O. Before doing so, she told them the following:
So when I meet with kids, I talk to them and I initially tell them about the talking
room that we're going to be talking in. And I let them know that -- I talk to kids every
day and kids talk to me about the things that happen to them. I also explain that they
will meet with a medical provider and that me and the people that I work with, it's
our jobs to help make sure that their bodies are safe and healthy.
T pg. 15, 10-15.
Both girls told her that inappropriate touching had occurred.

T pg. 15, ln. 24 – pg.

16, ln. 1.
Matthew Cox, M.D., testified that after the forensic interview there is “a full
head-to-toe medical examination often directed by the information we learn” which
“commonly involv[es] a detailed examination of the genitals and the anus[.]”

T pg. 35, ln.

13-21. What he hears in the forensic interviews helps to guide his medical examination.

T

pg. 37, ln. 18-22.
A.M.O. and A.G.O. have a disorder their mother, Lori Northam, calls “a chromosome
deletion,” which “affects their learning abilities.”

T pg. 239, ln. 14-24. Chromosomal

deletion syndrome causes an intellectual disability where the girls’ intellectual and
emotional age does not correspond with their biological age.
2

Id.

Both girls have an IEP

(Individualized Education Plan) at school. Although in ninth grade, the girls think at a third
grade level.

T pg. 224, ln. 9-20, pg. 225, ln. 2-5.

According to Dr. Cox:
So they have an abnormality in their genetic makeup. They have a missing
piece of their genetics which was causing their developmental delays and
their learning problems. So it’s a defect in their gene structure that leads to
them having problems. Particularly with these girls, significant delays in
their development and their cognition.
T pg. 410, ln. 13-21.

At the time of the accusations, the girls were developmentally at a

second grade level.

T pg. 240, ln. 22-25.

The court found that the CARES evidence was admissible, noting that “Clearly its
hearsay, but I think that it is exempt from the hearsay rule under 803(4).” T pg. 72, ln.
15-21. In support of its ruling, the trial court found that “based on the evidence that I've
heard today and what I've seen in 30-odd years, that [CARES’] focus is now primarily a
medical procedure intended to address trauma inflicted on children, discover and treat
that.” T pg. 71, ln. 19-23.

In light of that ruling the court did not address the admissibility

of the evidence under I.R.E. 803(24).

T pg. 72, ln. 15-21. (“I'm not going to address

803(24) because it seems like there is too many factors that go into that and I don't think I
have to since I'll find it's admissible under 803(4).”)2
3.

Evidence at trial

On May 30, 2017, A.M.O. told her student-helper, Nicci Curry, that “her Grandpa

Later the Court stated that “on balance it seems to me that the evidence is admissible
under 803(24).” But that was a slip of the tongue by the court, given its prior express
refusal to address the issue. Further, the court was addressing the question of whether
the hearsay was testimonial for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis and was not
conducting the analysis appropriate to admission of the evidence under the catch-all
provision. T pg. 74, ln. 11-14.
3
2

touched her private parts.”

Nicci told the vice-principal.

T pg. 216, ln. 6-24.

vice-principal asked A.M.O. to share with her what she had told Nicci.

The

T pg. 485, ln. 4-5.

The vice-principal then met with the girls’ mother, and the police were called and a CARES
interview arranged.

T pg. 234, lns. 1-25.

CARES interviewed A.M.O. on June 9, and A.G.O. on June 12.
Videos of the interviews were admitted at trial.
Dr. Cox examined A.G.O. on June 12.
of the hymen, with a tear.

T pg. 435, ln. 13-19; pg. 442, ln. 6-15.

T pg. 381, ln. 17-18.

T pg. 388, ln. 2-13.

T pg. 433, ln. 13-20.

He found a transection

He did not examine A.M.O., but photos

taken at her examination showed a transected hymen and two tears. T pg. 396, ln. 11-18.
While these injuries were consistent with the girls’ testimony, they were not, by
themselves proof of sexual abuse.
The greatest myth that I encounter is the thought that by strictly examining a
patient I can determine whether or not they’ve had sex and that the hymen is
torn the first time there is any sexual contact and that as a doctor I can see
that.
And actually the truth is the opposite. Most of the time just by looking I
can’t tell. It’s the words by the patient that are the most important
considerations.
T pg. 386, ln. 15-24.
All the transections were “well-healed,” meaning that they did not occur recently.
Dr. Cox said that “[i]f it’s [within] the last few days, I would see swelling and bruising of the
tissue if I look.”

T pg. 399, ln. 25-p. 400, ln. 6; pg. 402, ln. 2-7.

There is no way to

determine the timing or the mechanism of injury by physical examination alone.

T pg.

401, ln. 8- pg. 402, ln. 12.
A.M.O. testified that Mr. Christensen touched her “privacy” “[p]robably three” times.
4

T pg. 284, ln. 10.
287, on. 14.

Once was on the downstairs couch while A.G.O. was present.

She told him to stop and after he did she went into the bathroom.

“bleeding in the privacy.”
and she again bled.
8-15.

T pg.
She was

T pg. 288, ln. 1-22. The second time was on the upstairs couch

T pg. 289, ln. 1-8.

The third time was in A.G.O.’s bed.

T pg. 289, ln.

Although A.M.O. testified that A.G.O. was present at every touching, A.G.O. did not

testify that she was present.

T pg. 312, ln. 14-25; pg. 314, ln. 21; p. 333, ln. 24-p. 355, ln.

3; pg. 361, ln. 22-pg. 373, ln. 1.
touching in A.G.O.’s bed.

The jury acquitted Mr. Christensen of the charge alleging a

R 118.

A.G.O. testified that Mr. Christensen touched her while she, he, and Ms. Christensen
were all on the downstairs couch.

T pg. 366, ln. 1-5.

did not occur.

A.G.O. also said that Mr. Christensen touched her when

T pg. 506, ln. 10.

she was on her bed but that A.M.O. was not there.

Ms. Christensen testified that this

T pg. 367, ln. 9-14.

A.G.O. further testified that in March 2017, Mr. Christensen touched her when she
and Ms. Christensen were on the downstairs couch watching the Disney movie Moana.
pg. 343, ln. 5-15.

T

Ms. Christensen testified that she was there the entire time and nothing

inappropriate occurred.

T pg. 501, ln. 5-20; pg. 514, ln. 2-4.

Ms. Christensen testified that she and Mr. Christensen visited her daughter’s family
over Memorial Day weekend in 2017.

T pg. 502, ln. 3-12.

They watched the children on

Saturday while her daughter and her husband went to a wedding.

T pg. 505, ln. 2-21.

Ms. Christensen was at the house the entire weekend and did not see anything
inappropriate happen.

The “girls just wanted to be close to him and me.

And at no time

during the weekend did they act like they didn’t want to be around either of us.
behaved normally.”

T pg. 506, ln. 10-14.

They

When the Christensens left on Monday, “[t]he
5

girls were lovable, hugging us, saying they can’t wait to see us again.
to make plans to come for the summer.”

They were excited

T pg. 508, ln. 11-14.

The girls’ mother testified that when they are hurt, they “come to mom.”
neither came to her Memorial Day Weekend to complain of injury or bleeding.
ln. 13-21.

T pg. 474,

And, when she and her husband came home from the wedding, the girls

seemed fine.

T pg. 474, ln. 23-pg. 475, ln. 3.

Mr. Christensen testified.
inappropriately touch the girls.

T pg. 527, ln. 24.

He testified that he did not

T pg. 555, ln. 1-pg. 556, ln. 12.

In June 2017, Yakima police contacted him about the allegations.
8-21.

But,

T pg. 5661, ln.

He voluntarily met with a detective and gave a statement even after being given his

Miranda warnings.

T pg. 564, ln. 8-18. Consistent with his trial testimony, he told the

police that he did not inappropriately touch the girls.

T pg. 565, ln. 21-24.

Mr. Christensen was found guilty of Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5, and not guilty of Count 3.
R 116-120.

The court imposed a sentence of 20 years with eight determinate on each

count of conviction and ran all sentences concurrent to one another.
He filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
III.
1.

R 160-161.

R 164.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the CARES interviews as

statements made for a medical purpose without considering the factors set forth in Idaho
case law, including whether the developmentally delayed children understood their
statements were made for a medical purpose?
2.

Assuming any portion of the videos are admissible, did the court abuse its

discretion in admitting the entirety of the interviews without considering which particular
6

statements fell within the hearsay exception?
A. Introduction

IV.

ARGUMENT

The trial court has discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. State v.
Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 232, 786 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1990).

A decision to admit or deny such

evidence will be overturned on appeal upon a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Id.
To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, this Court will consider whether the trial
court (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of
that discretion, (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 195
(2018).

As explained below, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the CARES

videos because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
B. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the CARES interviews as
statements made for a medical purpose without considering the factors set forth in
Idaho case law, including whether the developmentally delayed children understood
their statements were made for that purpose.
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 801(c);
State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 704, 889 P.2d 729, 733 (Ct. App. 1994).

Hearsay is

inadmissible unless otherwise provided by an exception in the Idaho Rules of Evidence or
other rules of the Idaho Supreme Court. I.R.E. 802.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide an exception for “statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably
7

pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” I.R.E. 803(4).

The rule is premised on the

assumption that such statements are generally trustworthy because the declarant is
motivated by a desire to receive proper medical treatment and will therefore be truthful in
giving pertinent information to the physician.
P.2d 897, 908 (Ct. App. 1996)

See State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518, 927

(“[T]he generally acknowledged rationale behind this

hearsay exception, [is] that ‘the declarant's motive to disclose the truth because his
treatment will depend in part on what he says, guarantees the trustworthiness of the
statements.’”) quoting, Report of Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, C. 803, p. 6 (1983)
and citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992); Gonzales v. Hodsdon, 91 Idaho 330,
332, 420 P.2d 813, 815 (1966); Hillman v. Utah Power & Light Co., 56 Idaho 67, 76, 51 P.2d
703, 706 (1935).

Here, the trial court abused its discretion because it did not consider

whether A.M.O. and A.G.O. were informed of or otherwise appreciated the importance of
speaking truthfully to the CARES interviewer which is required for such statements to be
admissible under Rule 803(4).
Here, all the forensic interviewer said was, “it’s our jobs to help make sure that their
bodies are safe and healthy.”

T pg. 15, 10-15.

From this, it cannot be determined

whether the girls understood the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment.

Further, there is no indication in the record that either girl was told or

understood that they would be given a medical examination after the statements to the
forensic examiner.
The absence of such evidence is especially troubling because the children, while 13
years old, were developmentally delayed and function at a “six-or-seven-year old” level. T
pg. 411, ln. 16-22.

“Where an adult is the hearsay declarant, the motive to speak the truth
8

to a physician in order to advance a self-interest in obtaining proper medical care for the
declarant or another is generally assumed.” Id.

However, a “dilemma arises in attempting

to apply to children evidentiary rules which were drafted with adults in mind.”

State v.

Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518, 927 P.2d 897, 908 (Ct. App. 1996) Id., quoting State v. Dever, 596
N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ohio 1992).

To resolve that dilemma, the Kay Court concluded that

where the declarant is of tender years, the trial court should consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement to determine whether a young child's
statement was “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” Id.
Under Kay, the court may consider any factors which bear upon the likelihood that
the child made the statement for that purpose, including evidence indicating whether the
child understood the need to speak truthfully to the physician and factors that otherwise
indicate the reliability of the statements.

Circumstances to be considered may include: 1)

the child's age; 2) whether the child understands the role of the physician in general; 3)
whether the child was suffering pain or distress at the time; 4) whether the child's
statements were inappropriately influenced by others, as by leading questions from the
physician or a previous suggestive interrogation by another adult; 5) whether the
examination occurred during the course of a custody battle or other family dispute; 6) the
child's ability and willingness to communicate freely with the physician; 7) the child's
ability to differentiate between truth and fantasy in the examination itself and in other
contexts; 8) whether the examination was initiated by an attorney (which would suggest
that its purpose was for litigation rather than treatment); and 9) the timing of the
examination in relation to the trial.

Id.

When the Kay factors are considered, many militate against admission of the CARES
9

hearsay.

First, the children function at about a six to seven year old level.

against admission.

This weighs

There was no evidence that they understood the role of the physician

in general or that their statements would be used by a medical profession for diagnosis or
treatment.

Neither child was suffering pain or distress at the time of the interviews.

The

court did not know whether the children's statements were inappropriately influenced by
others, but it did know they were questioned by other adults prior to the CARES interview.
And, while the interview did not occur during the course of a custody battle or other family
dispute, there was a criminal investigation proceeding at the time.

Thus, the interview

was initiated by a person who had the possibility of litigation in mind.

Other Kay factors,

such as the timing of the interview, appear to be neutral.
Since the court did not apply the relevant legal factors and because when those
factors are applied they weigh against admission, this Court should vacate the convictions
and remand for a new trial.
C. The court abused its discretion by admitting the entirety of the interviews
without determining which particular statements fell within the hearsay exception.
Assuming that any of the statements were admissible, Mr. Christensen also objected
to the introduction of any statements made during the CARES interviews which were not
directed to medical diagnosis or treatment.

He wrote, “[t]he CARES interview is based on

a protocol outlined by the NICHD which explicitly states that the interview questions are
designed to build rapport and establish trust between the CARES social worker and the
child.

These questions are not for the expressed purpose of medical diagnosis or even

relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment.

Therefore, based on the Rules of Evidence,

any conversation for the purpose of building trust or establishing rapport is not relevant to
10

0r for the purpose of medical treatment."

R 68.

The forensic interviewer testified that the interview protocol was developed by the
National Institute of Child Health and

Human Development. T pg.

guidelines lay out ten questions that can be utilized to

funnel approach to

it,

direct questions that
5-10.3

so

it

starts

elicit

13, 1n. 9-13.

a disclosure.

There

is

down

into

information that the child has already said.”

T

very open ended and then this funnels

may include

“These

In this case, the interview started

with some introductory questions.

questions were directed t0 whether the child was competent to

(Timestamp 00:01 — 03:22); Exhibit

testify.

sort 0f a

more
pg. 16, 1n.

These

Exhibit 9

These had nothing to d0 with

10, [00:01-03:13).

medical diagnosisﬁ

The forensic interview moved 0n
with the children.

to a series of questions designed to build rapport

This phase included questions eliciting information about what the

child likes to do. Exhibit 9 (3:22 — 9:25); Exhibit 10 [3:14 — 6:57).

nothing to d0 with medical diagnosis.
trust

and conﬁdence

in the later

Further, the questions had the effect 0f building

statements of the

equal opportunity t0 interview the

Again, these had

girls

when the

defense did not have an

girls pretrial.

The list 0f questions are found in The National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development (NICHD) Protocol: Interview Guide (Appendix).

3

htt

:

nichd rotocol.com NICHDProtocolZ. df

View questioning intended t0 demonstrate competency
the statutory requirement that a child-witness competency determination be

4 In addition, permitting the jury to

violates

“conducted outside the presence of the jury[.]”
LC. § 19-3024[1),
abrogated in other
part by State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992) ("T0 the extent
that this statute attempts to prescribe the admissibility of hearsay evidence and is in
conﬂict with the Idaho Rules of Evidence, it is of no force or effect"). The procedural
requirement that a child competency hearing be held outside the presence 0f the jury was
not abrogated by Zimmerman.
See also, I.C. § 9202(2) (requiring “in chambers"

competency hearing for children under ten years 0f age.)
11

The third phase of the interview consisted of training in episodic memory, where
the forensic interviewer identified a recent event and then asked questions designed to
elicit details about that event.
diagnosis.

These questions had nothing to do with a medical

Exhibit 9 (9:25 – 14:14:24); Exhibit 10 (6:57 – 15:30).

It is not until the final phase of the interview that the substantive questions are
posed.

Until this point, none of the questions were directed toward information that

could be used for a medical diagnosis.

Thus, those answers are not admissible.

As might be obvious, “[o]nly out-of-court statements necessary for medical
diagnosis and treatment are admissible under I.R.E. 803(4).”
Idaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992).

State v. Zimmerman, 121

In Zimmerman, this Court found that

statements made by a child to a psychologist were not admissible under 804(4) because
she “did not make her statements to Dr. Krasnec for the purposes of medical treatment.
Therefore, it was error to admit them pursuant to this hearsay exception.” Ibid.

The

803(4) hearsay exception is based upon the common sense idea that statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis are generally trustworthy due to the desire to receive
proper medical treatment.

State v. Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908.

That

rationale only holds true for those statements which are actually directed toward medical
diagnosis.

Here, however, the CARES interviews were filled with answers to questions

which had nothing to do with medical diagnosis or treatment, but were asked for other
purposes such as establishing competency and building rapport.

They also included

statements made by the forensic interviewer which were not designed to elicit information
within the scope of the hearsay statement.

For example, the forensic interviewer elicited

statements from A.M.O. that A.G.O. said that she had been abused too.
12

Exhibit 9 (46:30 –

46:58).

That statement was hearsay under I.R.E. 801(c).

A similar situation was recently addressed in State v. Robins, --- Idaho ----, 431 P.3d
260, 273-74 (2018), where a long written statement by a co-defendant was introduced at a
joint trial as a statement against interest.

The Court acknowledged that such statements

are considered to be reliable but also wrote:
Yet, inherent in this notion is a narrow definition of “statement” such that the
exception “does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they
are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” Id. at 600-01.
This is so because “[t]he fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory
confession does not make more credible the confession's non-self-inculpatory
parts.” Id. at 599.
State v. Robins, 431 P.3d at 273-74, quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594,
596-97 (1994)
The Robins Court explained further that non-inculpatory statements may not be
presumed to be self-inculpatory for purposes of the exception solely because they are part
of a narrative that contains such statements. Thus, it required the court to “consider each
statement included in a broader narrative to determine whether it is in fact genuinely
self-inculpatory against the declarant.” Id.

And when so parsed, the Supreme Court found

only one statement which truly inculpated the co-defendant.

As in Robins, the court

should have considered each statement to determine whether the hearsay exception
applied. Finding otherwise would disregard the specific nature of the statements in
CARES videos and would, in turn, undercut “the careful standard that must be employed
when applying the hearsay exception.” State v. Robins, 431 P.3d 274-75.
Because the court did not apply the applicable legal standard to each hearsay
statement in the videos, it abused its discretion under Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, supra.
13

D. The evidence was not admissible under I.R.E. 803(24).
As the I.R.E. 803(4) ruling was in error, this Court will look to see if the court can be
affirmed on an alternative basis.

“When a decision is ‘based upon alternative grounds, the

fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if
the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds.’” Brown v. Greenheart, 157
Idaho 156, 165, 335 P.3d 1, 10 (2014), quoting Andersen v. Prof. Escrow Servs., 141 Idaho
743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005).

Here, the state also argued the evidence was admissible

under the “catch-all” exception to the hearsay rule, but the court declined to address that
exception as it had ruled the evidence was otherwise admissible under I.R.E. 803(4).
72, ln. 15-21.

T pg.

Thus, the admission of the evidence should not be affirmed under the

catch-all provision because the decision to admit the evidence was not based upon that
alternative ground.

Brown v. Greenheart, supra.

In addition, the evidence does not fall within the catch-all exception.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24)(A), allows the admission of hearsay when:
i
ii
iii
iv

the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.
it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice.

Here, the CARES videos were not admissible under this rule because both girls were
able to testify to the charged allegations.

Consequently, subsection (A)(iii) was not met.

E. The error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
“A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall
have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have
14

the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State

v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).
Mr. Christensen has met his burden of proving error, but the state cannot meet its
high burden of proof.

First, the case otherwise was not strong.

did not provide independent proof of the accusations.

The physical evidence

The girls seemed fine when the

parents returned from the wedding and neither girl told their mother that she had been
bleeding, even though they routinely went to their mother when injured.

Mr. Christensen

testified that he did not inappropriately touch the girls and Ms. Christensen corroborated
his testimony.

In addition, the videos improperly corroborated the girls’ testimony by

acting as prior consistent statements.

This corroborating effect was improper because

prior consistent statements may only be introduced “(i) to rebut an express or implied
charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence
or motive in so testifying; or (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant's credibility as a witness when
attacked on another ground.”
present here.

I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).

Neither of those circumstances are

The evidence also exposed the jury to questioning designed to demonstrate

the girls’ competency.
The prejudicial effect of the CARES videos may be best illustrated by noting the
state’s reliance upon it in its argument to the jury.

Although the girls testified at trial,

their testimony was very brief, vague, and unpersuasive.

The prior statements made in

the CARES videos were much more persuasive then the testimony.

The prosecutor

recognized this and used the CARES videos to great effect in closing argument saying “if
you had that sick feeling when you watched [A.G.O.’s ] CARES, if you had that feeling and
you did that when she was
15

testifying, you know it's true. And if you believe her, then he is guilty.” T pg. 603, ln. 5-9.
Defense counsel recognized the emotional impact and attempted to blunt its effect, but had
no adequate response: “I mean, I saw you folks watching the video, the CARES videos. They
are so cute in their way. They have a way about them individually and collectively that’s
truly unique. And there is an emotional assessment of watching that video as well as an
intellectual assessment.”

T pg. 610, ln. 7-15.

The prejudicial effect was so powerful, that

the prosecutor referred to the CARES tape at least twelve times during his arguments.

Id;

T pg. 598, ln.25; pg. 600, ln.8 (“Now, [A.M.O.’s] CARES, again, it happened right after and in
a safe space.) and 12; pg. 601, ln. 3 (“She goes into great detail about all of that in the CARES
video.”); pg. 602, ln. 10 (“she said that four times in her CARES video”); pg. 605, ln. 13 and
20; pg. 622, ln. 24; pg. 624, ln. 20; pg. 627, ln. 1-2 (“They couldn't have fooled CARES. They
couldn’t have fooled Lara Foster.”) and 25.

In light of the weakness of the state’s case

without the CARES evidence and its reliance upon the videos during closing arguments, any
argument by the state that the CARES videos were not the most important pieces of
evidence in its case would be disingenuous.
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of the above, Mr. Christensen asks the Court to vacate the judgments and
sentences, and remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February, 2019.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for David Christensen
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